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INTRODUCTION

H

IGH speed police pursuit of motorists attempting to evade
apprehension is a highly controversial topic bound up
in the broader issue of what constitutes effective law enforcement. From a sizable and influential police viewpoint, freedom
to pursue law violators is a vital measure of police deterrent
capability-not only in terms of their traffic supervision mission,
but also in relation to their broader crime control responsibilities. The basic argument advanced is that if police were
forbidden to engage in hot pursuit, or unduly restricted, then
chaos on the highways would be the result. In contrast, an
equally influential group from the traffic safety community,
particularly physicians, maintain that high-speed hot pursuits
result in an unacceptable number of casualties and that life
is too valuable to be jeopardized in the maintenance of what
they regard as an unproven assertion.
One of the basic reasons for this divergence of opinion is
the almost total lack of reliable information on the nature of
the hot pursuit situation. In an attempt to resolve some of
the basic questions of fact concerning the hot pursuit problem,
the National Highway Safety Bureau [now the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) ] commissioned
a national study of this problem by the Center for the Environment and Man, Inc., which was supported by the Indiana
University Institute for Research in Public Safety.
The study was conducted to determine the nature and
magnitude of the hot pursuit problem nationally and to prepare guidelines to assist policymakers in dealing with it. Specific objectives were to answer the following questions:
*President, Edmund F. Fennessy Associates, Hartford, Conn., a public
safety consulting firm; formerly Director of Law Enforcement and
Criminal Justice Studies at the Center for the Environment & Man (an
affiliate of the University of Connecticut), Hartford, Conn.; B.A., University of Hartford, 1965; graduate studies in systems analysis at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Trinity College, Case-Western Reserve
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*Director, Institute for Research in Public Safety, Indiana University,
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* What is the law regarding hot pursuit and how has it
been interpreted by the courts?
* How have police agencies translated the law into operational policy and training operations?
* How many high-speed pursuits occur nationally and
what are the operational characteristics, consequences,
and risks of such incidents?
" What existing and potential countermeasures are available and what are their merits and deficiencies?
The year long research project was completed in June 1970
and it is the purpose of this article to briefly summarize the
1
major findings of that investigation.
I. THE

NATIONAL STUDY

A. The Hot Pursuit Situation
The most commonly accepted definition of "hot pursuit" is:
[a]n active attempt by a law enforcement officer on duty in
a patrol car to apprehend one or more occupants of a moving
motor vehicle, providing the driver of such vehicle is aware
of the attempt and is resisting apprehension by maintaining
or by ignoring the law officer's ator increasing his speed
2
tempt to stop him.
A thorough definition is more complex. It can also refer to

the pursuit of an offender across a
or of a motorist who is unaware that
though the police officer must attain
to catch up with him. 4 The primary
however, is on those instances where
attempts to evade apprehension.

3

jurisdictional boundary
he is being chased, even
very high speeds simply
emphasis of this study,
the violator consciously

A common sequence of events leads to hot pursuit and
its several possible outcomes. First, a driver commits a traffic
violation or is engaged in some other activity that requires
police intervention. Second, a police officer observes this action

and decides to intervene or he is directed, usually by radio,
to apprehend a specific motorist. Third, the suspect driver
becomes aware of the officer's intention to stop him. Fourth,

the suspect driver decides to evade arrest-the first significant
1 E. FENNEssY, T. HAMILTON, K. JOSCELYN & J. MERiTT, A STUDY OF THE
PROBLEM OF HOT PURSUIT BY THE POLICE, Final Report to the National

Highway Safety Bureau, [Contract FH-11-7220], The Center for the

Environment & Man, Inc. [hereinafter cited as FENNESSY & JOSCELYN].
2 Credited to Major E. W. Jones of the North Carolina Highway Patrol.
It is clear, however, that the term has been implicitly understood to
have this meaning for years.
3 This is more precisely called "fresh pursuit."

4 This type of "pursuit" is quite frequent, as the officer must attain high
speeds (90-100 m.p.h.) simply to catch up with the speeder.
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event in hot pursuit. Fifth, the police officer decides to pursue
-the decisive event in hot pursuit. Alternatively, the officer
might decide to let the suspect go, or to attempt some other
strategy which would avoid hot pursuit. After the chase
begins, there are few possible outcomes: the pursued driver
may elect to stop, resulting in apprehension; the police officer
may elect to stop, resulting in escape; or if neither driver
chooses to terminate the chase, the third possible outcome will
be a crash involving the offender, the police, an innocent
bystander, or some combination of the three.
The pursued driver's action may be the result of a rational decision. For example, the risks of pursuit might be of
less importance to him than the penalties of apprehension
because he is a wanted felon or because his license is under
suspension. The decision may result, however, from a less
rational impulse. For example, he might be a teenage driver
who panics; he might invite a chase for the "thrill;" or he
may simply be too intoxicated or otherwise impaired to understand the consequences of his decision.
Although elements of irrationality such as the personal
challenge, a test of courage, or a hatred of criminals, might
enter into an officer's decision to pursue, his decision is usually
of a complex and rational nature. It will be influenced by the
characteristics of the area, the performance characteristics of
his vehicle, the type of road, the weather, the road conditions,
other traffic, his estimate of the risk of the pursuit, the seriousness of the initial violation, the probable risks to the public of allowing the suspect driver to continue his evasion
attempt, and a host of other factors that are a function of
the particular incident. Other influences such as the stated
and implied policy of his department, his training, the attitude
and practices of his fellow officers, and his previous pursuit
experiences, will also modify his decision.
All of these factors must be evaluated by the officer as
he makes a decision, which under the best circumstances will
result in the successful apprehension of the suspect vehicle
without a crash. Under the worst conditions, the decision
could result in death or serious injury to the officer or to
others, as well as a lawsuit and departmental discipline if it
is determined that the officer failed to exercise "due care."
The law has attached to the events in a typical hot pursuit
various rights and duties. The authority of a police officer
to engage in hot pursuit stems from his duty to apprehend
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those persons who have committed or are committing a crime.
Often the initial offense may be a traffic violation, but in all
hot pursuit cases the pursuee's behavior constitutes the failure
to obey the command of a law enforcement officer to stop.-5
The pursuee is not relieved of any duties to obey normal
traffic laws, but the pursuer is if he drives an authorized
emergency vehicle (as statutorily defined), and if he exercises due care (privileged status theory) 6 or due regard for
the safety of others (right of way theory). 7 In addition to
pursuing, the police may use roadblocks in order to apprehend a fleeing motorist.8
If a collision occurs during hot pursuit, the pursuing officer and his employer will be exempted from civil liability if
the officer has complied with the statutory standard of due
care or due regard." Even when the pursuing officer has not
met the statutory standard, the fashioning of a remedy for
an injured third party may prove futile: most policemen
have limited financial resources; liability of the police agency
may be defeated by sovereign immunity; or, where there
is no bar, the claims process may be unduly burdensome to
the third party. Furthermore, if the negligent pursuee is uninsured or judgment proof, the third party must look to his
own insurance coverage for compensation because the pursuee's negligence will not be imputed to the pursuer.10
B. The Study Design
The initial objectives of this study as stated by the National Highway Safety Bureau required the research team to
obtain primary study data from a sample of representative
U.S. police departments. Their records were to be the basic
source of data, but it was found that police agencies simply
5 Either failure to obey a lawful order of a police officer or fleeing a
police officer is a crime in all states. See, e.g., UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE
§§ 11-103, 11-904 (Supp. 1969); FENNESSY & JOSCELYN, supra note 1,
app. D, for a comprehensive list of state statutes.
6 For cases construing "due care" see Torres v. Los Angeles, 58 Cal. 2d 35;
22 Cal. Rptr. 866, 372 P.2d 906 (1962); Parker v. Knox, 147 Me. 396, 87
A.2d 663 (1952); Altenberg v. Sears, 249 Md. 298, 239 A.2d 569 (1968);
Varlaro v. Schultz, 82 N.J. Super. 142, 197 A.2d 16 (1964). See also UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE § 11-106 (1967).
7 UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE § 11-405. See also FENNESSY & JOSCELYN, supra
note 1, app. B, for a comprehensive list of state statutes.
s Kagel v. Brugger, 19 Wis. 2d 1, 119 N.W.2d 394 (1963).

9 E.g., United States v. Hutchins, 268 F.2d 69 (6th Cir. 1959); Pagels v.
San Francisco, 135 Cal. App. 2d 152, 286 P.2d 877 (1955); City of Miami
v. Horne, 198 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1967).
10 See generally Pagels v. San Francisco, 135 Cal. App. 2d 152, 286 P.2d 877
(1955); Draper v. Los Angeles, 91 Cal. App. 2d 315, 205 P.2d 46 (1949);
Chambers v. Ideal Pure Milk Co., 245 S.W.2d 589 (Ky. 1952); Staton v.
State, 29 App. Div. 2d 612, 285 N.Y.S.2d 964 (1967).
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were unable to provide us with valid historical data. Thus,
a modified study design was implemented: a comprehensive
survey of the law as it relates to hot pursuit was accomplished through a review of state statutes and associated case
decisions," seven sample sites were visited; a survey questionnaire was sent to 130 police departments serving cities of
over 100,000 and to 48 state-level police agencies; previous
research on the subject was reviewed; and after an initial
analysis indicated that data from these sources was inadequate to meet the needs of the study, a 1-month, "real time"
field study was developed.
C.

Previous Studies

Our literature search identified almost 100 documents
dealing directly or indirectly with hot pursuit. While many
of these reports were useful in providing interesting descriptive or conceptual background material, we found only three
documents that had quantitative substance. Unfortunately,
each of these three reports had serious technical flaws.
A North Carolina Highway Patrol Study 12 of the problem
was well conducted but is unreliable because of the very
small (1 week) data sample. In addition, not enough detail is
provided on quality control of the data to make any firm
judgment as to the validity of its results. A Michigan State
Police study was reported in a journal article, 13 but despite
numerous attempts on our part, the original study could not

be located. The referenced article contained excellent detail
on pursuit characteristics but almost no concrete information
on study methodology or pursuit consequences.
The only national estimate of pursuit crash data we found
was a 1968 report prepared by an organization known as the
Physicians for Automotive Safety (PAS). 14 This report attracted serious attention and received nationwide circulation
by the news media. The dramatic nature of the PAS findings

IIInterested

readers are referred to FENNESSY & JOSCELYN, supra note
1, where over 100 pages are devoted to this particular approach. Commencing with a description of the legal parameters surrounding the
emergency vehicle, the analysis discusses appropriate situations for
operation, mode of operation, degree of care legally required by the
operator, and the liability involved, such as the sanctions associated with
"fleeing a pclice officer" and their possible deterrent effect on potential
offenders.
12North Carolina Highway Patrol, Pursuit Survey, North Carolina, 1968
(mimeo.).
13 Frazier, High Speed Pursuit, 1961 POLICE CHIEF 38-40.
14 Physicians for Automotive Safety, Rapid Pursuit by the Police: Causes,
Hazards, Consequences: A National Pattern is Evident, Springfield, N.J.,
1968 (mimeo.).
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(which were generally accepted at face value) provoked considerable editorial comment-much of it critical of the police.
The basic conclusions of the study were:
* One out of five pursuits end in death.
* Five out of 10 pursuits end in injury.
" Seven out of 10 pursuits end in accidents.
* One out of 25 killed is a policeman.
* More than 500 Americans die each year as the result of
15
rapid pursuit by the police.
[There are] grave doubts on the payoff in rapid pursuit. The
costs in deaths and injuries hardly sustain the risks involved,
especially for the police and injured bystanders. The whole
paramount concern is public health, we have no conflict in
judging the value of human life before all other considera6

tions.1

Closer examination of the PAS study by concerned law
enforcement researchers disclosed some serious technical deficiencies. The primary area of criticism of the study surrounded
the ratio statistics presented which were based on a 3-month
sample of newsclippings. The number of pursuit accidents,
the number of fatalities, and the number of injuries-serious
and minor-were tabulated and extrapolated by PAS to obtain
an annual estimate of the size of the problem. This data sample contains obvious biases; for example, pursuits where no
crash occurred generally would not be reported. 17 The fatality
and injury totals, however, are reasonably reliable. The study
indicates that 500 deaths and 1,200 injuries per year can be
expected as the result of rapid pursuit.
D. Police Records
To determine the current state of affairs regarding pursuit policy, a request for material on such policies was sent
to 130 cities with populations over 100,000 and the 48 statelevel police agencies within the continental United States.
A response rate of 40 percent (52 cities) was obtained from
the city sites. At the state level, 22 replies were receiveda response of about 46 percent.
The findings of this phase of the study indicate that existing police pursuit policy consists of three basic types:
* Officer Judgment Model: All basic decisions to initiate,
15 Id. at 14.

16 Id.at 15.
17

See FENNESSY & JOSCELYN, supra note 1, where numerous technical defects are pointed out; the most serious is the lack of reliable data on
pursuit frequency.
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conduct, or terminate hot pursuit are made by the street
officer. His decisions are subject to internal review and
possible legal action, depending on "due care" provisions.
0 Restrictive Policy Model: There are certain restrictions
on the officer's decision to initiate, conduct, or terminate
a pursuit. Examples are: only pursue for felonies; no
speed above 20 m.p.h. over posted limits; stop at intersections.
* Pursuits Discouraged: Officers are cautioned or discouraged from engaging in hot pursuit. None of the
agencies, however, expressly forbids pursuit if there is
no other choice and if it is an extreme emergency.
The officer judgment policy was by far (80 percent of the
responses) the most predominant type in U.S. police agencies.
A much smaller number of agencies (about 15 percent) subscribe to the restrictive model. Less than 5 percent of the
police agencies responding to this survey have a formal written policy discouraging rapid pursuit.
Information on pursuit training was concurrently requested of the agencies, and project staff members attended
pursuit driver training programs presented by the California
Highway Patrol and the North Carolina Highway Patrol.
These agencies are generally considered to conduct the most
advanced training in this area. After reviewing the information obtained from the mailing, supplemented by detailed interviews with training experts, we can safely conclude that
less than 25 percent of the nation's police officers with road
patrol responsibilities have completed an adequate formal
pursuit driving or emergency vehicle operations course.
Sixteen of the 74 responding agencies also provided us
with quantitative data on hot pursuit problems. The quality
of the data varied widely. In some cases, all we were given
were pursuit-related fatalities; in others, the agency purported to supply us with complete information on the phenomenon.
Thus, inadequate, inconsistent, and sometimes suspicious
records proved to be the first major obstacle to the study.
After visiting the sample sites, analyzing the mail survey, and
reviewing the literature, we concluded that defining the national implications of hot pursuit with a historical data collection approach was unworkable. The basic reasons for the
deficiencies were:
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" There is no universally understood terminology or law
defining "hot pursuit," and a wide spectrum of confusing
definitions exists. Without precise definition, it is impossible to equate the pursuit problems of one jurisdiction with those of another.
" There are no hard and fast standards in existence for
charging violators who are apprehended as the result
of a high-speed pursuit. Our preliminary study indicated that charges placed against such violators may
often include the violation for which the pursuit was
initiated, prior felonies, or acts committed or discovered at the point of capture. In short, the offender could
be charged with almost anything, and often the specific act of fleeing the officer would not be included.
• Isolation of pursuit incidents or pursuit-related crashes
through historical records analysis is exceedingly difficult because most police records systems are organized
around names rather than offense types. Thus, if an
offender is arrested for a pursuit-related incident, the
record of this offense will be filed by his name. Retrieving this case from a manual records system would
require an examination of all records to isolate the hot
pursuit event.
* Pursuit events in which the offender eludes the police
are seldom, if ever, permanently recorded.
" Records of pursuit are filed primarily for self-defense
in the event there is adverse public reaction or civil
lawsuit.
* Confusing and inconsistent practices prevail in the reporting of the pursuit-related accidents."5
Based on this analysis, it was clear that none of the departments could supply us with data that would enable us to
18 In two separate but similar accidents that occurred in a major city one

charged the pursuing officer and the other the pursued violator. Both
events began when an officer observed a violator drive through a red
traffic signal. In both incidents the officer had the green traffic signal,
so he immediately followed the violator. In each case, following standard operating procedures, the officer used his warning light and siren,
and in each case, the violator stopped. No high speed chases, or any
other acts that would endanger any motorist or pedestrians, were involved in the resulting "pursuit" accidents. In the first, the pursuing
officer clipped the front bumper of a parked vehicle as he was attempting to park behind the violator. In the second, the violator, endeavoring
to stop for the officer, drove over a small wooden plank which flipped
onto the hood of the police car doing minor damage. In neither incident
was the damage of sufficient amount to require the filing of an official
state accident report. Both accidents, however, were recorded by the
police department as "pursuit" accidents, because a police vehicle was
attempting to stop a violator.
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make a reliable determination of the total number of pursuits
that occurred during the time period specified for the study.
The Field Study
With the inadequate data sources we found in the police
records survey, it was impossible to validate and supplement
these findings without a substantial and costly data collection program. Within the scope of this study, such an approach
was infeasible. As an alternative, it was decided to embark
upon a small field study which might lead to some results
or conclusions that could be combined with other available
data to provide a reasonably valid estimate of the national
dimensions of the problem.
E.

A program for data collection under controlled operational conditions was designed and four agencies agreed to
participate: the North Carolina Highway Patrol; the Fairfax
County, Virginia Police Department; the South Bend, Indiana
Police Department; and the Bloomington, Indiana Police Department. A special collection form was designed and a staff
member of the research team spent considerable time at each
agency training the officers in its use. Following the training
period, a full month's data were collected at each site. Followup quality control visits were also made to each agency to
resolve any problems. Over 1,400 police officers participated
in this study. The combined data from the four sites produced the following results:
* Forty-six pursuits were recorded by the 1,400 officers.
" One out of nine pursuits ended in a crash.
* One out of 15 pursuits ended in a minor injury.
* Eight out of 10 pursuits ended in the successful (no
crash, no escape) apprehension of the offender.
* No fatal pursuit crashes were reported.
* Alcohol played a role in more than half of the pursuits.
" One out of 10 chases resulted in the offender escaping.
* Most pursuits occurred at night, and particularly during weekends.
* The apprehended drivers, as a group, had a significantly
higher than "average" number of prior accidents, violation convictions, and suspensions.
" One out of seven chases involved vehicles that were
"modified" to attain high speeds.
* Over 95 percent of the apprehended drivers were males
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and were predominantly
24 and under).

(75

percent)

youthful

(age

* One out of seven apprehended drivers, for whom records were available, was driving without a valid license
(suspended, revoked, or no license at all).
" The longest chase distance reported was 15 miles, the
shortest less than 1 mile.
• Twenty-eight percent of the chases took place in predominantly residential areas; the remainder occurred
under primarily rural conditions.
" The average pursuit speed was 85 m.p.h. The average
of the highest speeds attained during the 46 pursuits
was 98 m.p.h. The maximum chase speed reported was 135
m.p.h. The lowest was 30 m.p.h. (during heavy traffic).
It is evident that these results are almost totally contradictory to those obtained during the PAS study. We do not
make any claims that these results provide us with anything
more than some initial quantitative suggestions, with respect
to national conditions. We are convinced, however, that our
findings are highly accurate in terms of the conditions existing at our test sites. These data were collected under controlled conditions and, as such, represent the only data of
this type available. Thus, this brief field collection effort
provides us with a stable baseline against which we will compare the data collected in other phases of this study.
F. Extrapolating the Data
The following findings are supported by a detailed examination of previous studies, data available from police agencies, and our 1-month field rtudy:
* The majority of pursuit-related fatalities and injuries
are incurred by the fleeing driver, his passengers, or
uninvolved bystanders.
" The event that initiates the pursuit is a traffic violation in more than 90 percent of the cases.
" Young (under age 24) male drivers with relatively poor
driving records are most likely to attempt to flee from
a police officer.
" Alcohol plays a role in more than half of the cases.
" A significant number of known offenders (roughly 15
percent) were driving without a valid driver's license
at the time they tried to evade apprehension.
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* About 50 percent of the apprehended offenders had at
least one prior license suspension or revocation on their
records.
* Only a relatively small number (3 to 8 percent) of hot
pursuits involve stolen vehicles.
" The majority of pursuits occur at night and particularly
on weekends.
These findings, however, do not necessarily accurately
characterize the scope of the hot pursuit problem on a national basis. With insufficient, vague, and unreliable data, the
only reasonable way to define the national dimensions of the
problem was to use careful estimation procedures based on
extrapolation from the available data.' Such estimates could
not, of course, be precise. The best we could hope to achieve
was a scientifically defensible estimate of the order of magnitude of the problem. With criteria developed and applied
rigorously to the data, we arrived at "most probable or likely
ranges" for pursuit, crashes, fatalities, and injuries. In a
casual examination, the resulting ranges may seem too indefinite to be of value. Although imprecise, the estimates are the
most accurate that can be expected at this time, and unless
there is a pressing need for more statistically precise information, we believe them to be adequate for most conceivable
decisionmaking purposes.
Our summary conclusion, based on all of the available
evidence, indicates that each year, between 50,000 and 500,000
hot pursuits occur in the United States, and between 6,000
and 8,000 of these pursuits result in crashes. In pursuit-related
crashes, we estimated that from 300 to 400 people are killed
and from 2,500 to 5,000 people are injured. These values represent the "most likely" ranges, and were developed by means
of extrapolation from all available evidence. The figures
should not be converted to ratios (e.g., one in 20 pursuits end
in a crash) because of the lack of precise definition of the
pursuit event and the variability and uncertainty of the area.
For each of these estimates, there are boundary conditions that represent conceivable, but extremely unlikely,
values. For example, it is quite unlikely that less than 20,000
or more than 600,000 pursuits occur per year. Comparable
"boundary" ranges are: for pursuit crashes, 2,000 and 25,000;
for pursuit crash injuries, 2,000 and 15,000; for pursuit deaths,
19) See FENNESSY & JOSCELYN, supra note 1, for a detailed discussion of the
methodology utilized in developing these estimates.
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100 and 1,000. We emphasize that these are extrapolations of
the available data, which are scanty at best.
II.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Our primary recommendation is that local police agencies
adopt a hot pursuit control program consisting of five components:
(1) The development of a hot pursuit data base: Without knowledge of the nature of the hot pursuit problem within
a jurisdiction it will be impossible to formulate a rational
policy or to avoid the misallocation of resources. The inability
of the majority of agencies to supply us with any data on
pursuits in their jurisdictions is disheartening and should be
remedied. Thus, we strongly recommend the collection and
analysis of a large seasonal sample of data on the incidence,
characteristics, and consequences of hot pursuit and the collection and analysis of a representative sample of data on
fleeing offenders' characteristics. Careful investigation should
also be made of the reasons that underlie the decision to
evade arrest and police officer pursuit motivation. 0 The collection of these data is a countermeasure that can be undertaken immediately and which will allow improved police
training and policy formulation.
(2) Limiting the number of hot pursuits: A reduction
in the number of hot pursuits will result in a reduction of
the number of related crashes. The adoption of this policy
should be dependent on the analysis of pursuit data by each
police agency. This measure will not be appropriate if the
pursuit crash experience is negligible.
(3) Police hot pursuit driver training: Training officers
for hot pursuits is a matter of life and death. To be effective
it must contain, as a minimum, 50 hours of: formal classroom
training, practical driving instruction at a well-designed facility, skid-pad practice, and defensive driving instruction similar
to the National Safety Council program.
(4) Equipment to minimize risk: The police vehicle is
vital to the pursuit control program; it should be the best
and safest available; but proposed equipment changes must
provide benefits proportionate to the costs. As a minimum,
it is recommended that police vehicles that are likely to
engage in hot pursuit have sufficient speed to overtake any
20 Although most of the officers in the field study sample who engaged
in a pursuit were under 30, one 48-year-old officer accounted for four
of the 46 chases.
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stock vehicle manufactured in the U.S. and be equipped with
the latest in safety features recommended by NHTSA. In
addition, supporting communications and warning devices
should be given the same attention.
(5) Development of an increased capability to keep unlicensed drivers off the road: The available evidence indicates that drivers whose licenses are suspended or revoked
are involved in a disproportionate number of pursuits. The
present system of suspension enforcement is simply not
working. Thus, the development of an increased level of spot
checks, surveillance, and investigation by the police will add
some real deterrent to the existing system and should keep
a number of suspended drivers off the road. The net result
should be fewer hot pursuits.
Although hot pursuit is a problem that must be managed
at the local level, it is clear that it is of national scope, and
federal response is in order. A national agency should assist
and encourage a representative sample of state, county, and
municipal jurisdictions to engage in the hot pursuit data collection we have earlier recommended. The federal agency
should prepare a data collection manual specifying definitions, procedures, and methods of reporting. The pursuit survey form used in the field study portion of this project is
recommended as the collection instrument. Data subsequently
obtained should be analyzed and disseminated to the widest
possible audience in a continuing program that will identify
trends and test countermeasures.
The data reviewed by this study indicate that individuals
who attempt to flee from the police have a significantly
higher number of accidents, a greater number of arrests and
convictions for moving violations, and a much higher number
of suspensions than "normal" drivers. A detailed national
study should be made to determine the significant personality
variables associated with these offenders so that appropriate
screening, adjudication, and treatment programs can be developed. To provide for the development of treatment programs,
it is recommended that the NHTSA encourage and assist state
and local agencies in the implementation of an education program aimed specifically at high-risk drivers in order to provide them with knowledge of the personal risk, legal penalties, and social costs associated with hot pursuit.
It is also recommended that the NHTSA and other concerned federal agencies encourage and assist the states in
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the development and construction of hot pursuit training facilities. The initial cost of each such facility should be in the
neighborhood of $250,000. The use of deactivated military
bases should be explored.
We make two recommendations to state legislatures: First,
increased penalties for the offense of fleeing a police officer
should be studied. Second, each state should establish a compensation system funded from gasoline or highway use fees
to provide financial relief to innocent third parties who are
injured in the course of a hot pursuit and who are without
recourse under the present system.
Numerous technical countermeasures, which could be
useful in reducing the need for and the consequences of hot
pursuits, have been suggested. 21 None, however, is a panacea.
Each will be costly to develop, and most of them will be
alterable by a determined mechanic. Although detailed technical and operational studies will be required before any
serious consideration be given them, the concepts are these:
(1) Low-frequency remote ignition shut-down system:
A receiver unit, installed as an integral part of a vehicle's
spark plugs, could be triggered from a pursuing vehicle and
render the fleeing vehicle inoperative. It should be possible
to produce these devices in large quantity for under $1.00
per unit.
(2) Speed limiting devices: Design changes could be required in all new vehicles available to the public, or governors could be required on all new and used vehicles.
(3) Vehicle identification system: Passive transmitters
that could be triggered either by units in police vehicles or
by detectors imbedded in roadways could be installed in all
vehicles. This system would enable the police to track an
automobile without the need to maintain line-of-sight view
of the fleeing driver.
(4) Bystander warning systems: A number of technical
measures have been suggested to protect third-party drivers,
and pedestrians. Improved sirens, visual signals, officer-activated traffic lights, and radio-interrupt devices present some
initial possibilities.

21

supra note 1, lists and describes in detail all the
proposed technical countermeasures.
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CONCLUSION

Although an estimated 400 hot pursuit-related deaths per
year represent less than 1 percent of all motor-vehiclerelated fatalities, it is a significant absolute number. This
study demonstrates that hot pursuit is a problem of national
scope, and it suggests that hot pursuit is not an isolated phenomenon. It is closely related to other critical aspects of traffic safety, namely: alcohol abuse and driving, the problems
of youthful drivers, ineffective enforcement of license suspension, and high speed driving. Thus our findings not only
recommend the implementation of policies directly affecting
the causes and consequences of hot pursuits but also strengthen
the case for the development of integrated traffic safety
measures dealing with many related problems.

